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It is a great pleasure to be here at the University of Florida to dedicate
the Lawton Chiles Legal Information Center. Your new building is so
beautiful, it looks like a Gothic cathedral. With your new high-tech
classrooms and your additional library space, you will be well equipped
to meet the demands of contemporary legal education. These new facilities
are bound to inspire academic achievement, nurture interesting and
valuable scholarship, and nourish a sense of community among the
school's students, faculty, staff, and alumni.
As magnificent as it is, what I would like to talk to you about today is
not your new building. Instead, I would like to talk about one important
use of the information you will receive as you use this library and what
you will do once you leave; the part you will play, whether you know it or
not, in maintaining individual liberty and the rule of law.
It's elementary high-school civics that we have three branches of
government, which regulate each other by an intricate system of checks
and balances. The main check the judicial branch has on the others is the
power to declare statutes or executive acts unconstitutional, though
sometimes we might check the political branches in a softer way, merely
by interpreting a statute in light of constitutional values or by ruling that
a regulation or executive act isn't authorized by statute. But whatever
courts do, we have the power to make the President or Congress really,
really angry. In fact, if we do not make them mad some of the time, we
probably aren't doing our jobs. Our effectiveness, therefore, relies on the
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knowledge that we won't be subject to retaliation for our judicial acts. As
Madison put it-and he, being the Father of our Constitution, should be
heard-an independent judiciary is "an impenetrable bulwark against
every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive." Well,
impenetrablemay be putting it a bit strongly. But the basic idea is sound:
If you believe, as Madison and I do, that the courts are important
guardians of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms in our common-law
system, you know that the system breaks down without judicial
independence.
Judicial independence is hard to define: Judges can be subject to
discipline for legitimate reasons, and the political branches properly
control, to some degree, the jurisdiction and political makeup of the
federal courts and the various state courts. But, if I may coin a phrase, I
know judicial independence when I see it. For instance, suppose, during
a period of stormy relations between the White House and the Chief
Justice, the President's bodyguards killed the Chief Justice's pet cat. Or
suppose the executive branch threatened to cut the water supply to the
Supreme Court building to prevent the Court from meeting and making
anti-Presidential statements, or the Council of Ministers tried to evict the
Constitutional Court from its offices. The first two events actually
happened in the early- to mid- 1990s in Russia under Yeltsin, and the third
happened in Bulgaria in 1995. I think we can all agree that is not judicial
independence.
Judicial independence doesn't happen all by itself. It's tremendously
hard to create, and easier than most people imagine to destroy. That's why
the building where I work features a larger-than-life statue of John
Marshall, who spent thirty-five years trying to nurture a culture where the
political branches were, by and large, willing to acquiesce in the judicial
branch's interpretation of the law. They don't always acquiesce, but
fortunately, most of the time, politicians don't challenge the courts to
come enforce their judgments themselves, as Andrew Jackson did in the
wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Worcester v. Georgia.Creating
a culture in the early Republic where, usually, courts' judgments were
enforced by the other branches of government is an accomplishment that
entitles John Marshall to take his place together with Hammurabi, Grotius,
and Confucius-if I may cite foreign law for a second-in the frieze of
great lawgivers that appears along the top of the courtroom where the
Supreme Court Justices sit.
That is why it is so heartening to see judicial independence take root
in young democracies, like some of the newly independent countries of
eastern Europe. Ukraine is perhaps the most visible recent example. In the
late 1990s, Ukraine's Supreme Court and Constitutional Court repeatedly
upheld the rule of law-barring the government from refusing to register
candidates or from preventing lawfully elected candidates to take office,
enforcing the constitutional prohibition against national deputies' holding
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/1
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two government positions at once, and so on. When Yulia
Tymoshdnko--now the Ukrainian prime minister, then a reform-minded
deputy prime minister for fuel in the energy sector-was arrested in 2001,
the Ukrainian Supreme Court ruled that she had been illegally imprisoned
and prohibited attempts to rearrest her. Most recently, of course, during the
Orange Revolution of 2004, in the face of tremendous political pressure,
the Ukrainian Supreme Court voided the presidential runoff between the
two Viktors-Viktor Yanuk6vich, the prime minister, and Viktor
Yfishchenko, the opposition candidate-which had been tainted by serious
charges of voter fraud. The oral arguments, which lasted five days, were
marked by a level of transparency atypical for the ex-Soviet world: The
proceedings were broadcast live on Ukrainian TV. I hope the experience
of the Orange Revolution will set the stage for lasting post-Soviet reform
in that country, and I hope that American lawyers will continue to help
reformers there and in struggling democracies generally-as they did in
the runup to the presidential election, when the ABA's Central European
and Eurasian Law Initiative (CEELI), working through American
volunteer lawyers, held regional training sessions for judges on election
law and its application, helped train political party lawyers, and set up
public education seminars at Ukrainian academic institutions.
But of course, not every country is a Ukraine. Maybe some of you have
been following events over the last few years in Zimbabwe, the home of
what has to be one of the most nightmarish tyrannies in the world today.
There, President Robert Mugabe not only decided that white farmers' land
should be expropriated and given to blacks, but also instituted a "fast
track" procedure to hand over the land before any legal proceedings had
been completed. In 2000, a challenge to the fast track procedure found
itself in Zimbabwe's Supreme Court. In the middle of election season, 200
demonstrators-Mugabe supporters all-stormed the Supreme Court and
occupied the building for two hours; several of them climbed behind the
judges' bench, dancing, chanting ruling party slogans, and hammering the
bench with their fists. After the demonstrators had been cleared out, the
Supreme Court nonetheless ruled that the fast track procedure was
unconstitutional. But the Mugabe government ignored the ruling, and the
protesters suggested revoking two of the white justices' citizenship. The
Chief Justice resigned under intense pressure, including threats of violence
by local militias-vocally supported by government ministers-against
judges who opposed land reform and their families.
More recently, in 2002, the Supreme Court in Zimbabwe threw out
some of Mugabe's election laws, finding that they were improperly
ratified and violated voters' constitutional rights. Mugabe nonetheless
proclaimed that the laws "shall be deemed to have been lawfully" adopted.
A judge on that panel-the last non-black judge on the Supreme
Court-resigned, without giving any reasons. Another judge, who in 2003
freed an opposition activist who had been arrested for holding an illegal
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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rally, was suspended and made to face charges that are widely believed to
be trumped up.
Thankfully, our judiciary doesn't have to fear Zimbabwe-style
persecution. Fourscore or so years before our Constitution was adopted,
the British Parliament passed the Act of Settlement of 1701, which limited
the succession to the British throne to Anglicans, but also, more
importantly for us, provided that judges would hold office and draw their
salaries during good behavior-or, as the statute put it, qucimdiu se bene
g~sserint.Now we have Article III, which says basically the same thing,
except in English and without the part about the Anglicans. As you can
read in the FederalistPapers-it'sanonymous, but I can tell you this part
was written by Hamilton-"The complete independence of the courts of
justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited
Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions
to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills
of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind
can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of
courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the
manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations
of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing." This is why,
says Hamilton, judicial independence is especially important in the
American system. But, as the Founders knew, statutes and constitutions
don't protect judicial independence: People do. And the value ofjudicial
independence is a lesson that even some of our leaders perhaps have not
learned.
In a recent speech at a conservative conference, a prominent House
leader said that "[j]udicial independence does not equal judicial
supremacy." In particular, he faulted the courts for their decisions on
abortion and school prayer and for improperly citing international law.
This was after the Terri Schiavo case, when the federal courts applied
Congress's one-time-only statute as it was written, but, alas, perhaps not
how the Congressman wished it had been written. In response to this
flagrant display of judicial restraint, the Congressman blasted the courts
for ignoring Congressional intent. "These are not examples of a mature
society," he said, "but of a judiciary run amok." Speakers at that
conference advocated "mass impeachment," stripping the courts of
jurisdiction to hear certain cases, and using Congress's budget authority
to punish offending judges.
Mass impeachments-now that is something we have not heard
suggested until lately. Impeachment for a judge's judicial acts has been
politically taboo since the failure of Justice Samuel Chase's impeachment
back in 1805. Jurisdiction-stripping proposals are nothing new, though
their ancient use is no defense. In the 1950s, the proposals suggested
stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over desegregation and domesticsecurity cases; in the 1960s, the controversy was over the admissibility of
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss1/1
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confessions in criminal cases; in the 1970s, it was over busing; in the
1980s, it was about abortion and school prayer; and now we have the
Pledge of Allegiance and gay marriage thrown into the mix as well.
Congress has never given Article III courts as much jurisdiction as the
Constitution allows, and quite frankly, most federal judges think we have
quite enough cases as it is. Article III allows Congress to make exceptions
to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, and even abolish lower courts
entirely. The merits of all these measures are debatable-as long as they're
not retaliation for past federal court decisions.
It gets worse: In all the federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
death threats have become increasingly common. Judge Greer, who
handled the Schiavo case down here for over a decade, has received
menacing e-mails and death threats. We've seen this before-Justice Hugo
Black often wore a chest protector provided by the Secret Service when he
visited Birmingham; my former colleague Harry Blackmun got death
threats because of Roe v. Wade, and his window was once shattered by a
gun shot. It doesn't help when a high-profile senator, after noting that
decisions he sees as activist cause him "great distress," suggests there may
"a cause-and-effect connection" between such activism and the "recent
episodes of courthouse violence in this country."
These comments have all come from Republicans, but of course
Republicans aren't the sole offenders. A former Democratic president
complained, in words that sound much like current congressional
complaints, that "the Court has more and more often and more and more
boldly asserted a power to veto laws passed by the Congress and by state
legislatures.... The Court has been acting not as a judicial body, but as
a policymaking body." He accused the Court of "improperly set[ting] itself
up as a third house of the Congress-a super-legislature... -reading into
the Constitution words and implications which are not there, and which
were never intended to be there."
Like some members of Congress, this former president paid lip service
to judicial independence, saying, "I want-as all Americans want-an
independent judiciary as proposed by the framers of the
Constitution"--but made clear that he did not mean "a judiciary so
independent that it can deny the existence of facts which are universally
recognized." He believed in "a government of laws and not of men," but
believed that this meant "we must take action to save the Constitution
from the Court and the Court from itself." This president's plan was
"simply this: [W]henever a judge or justice of any federal court has
reached the age of seventy and does not avail himself of the opportunity
to retire on a pension, a new member shall be appointed ....

."

I'm sure

you all remember, that was Franklin Roosevelt's fireside chat of March 9,
1937. He's the fellow on the dime.
Now President Roosevelt was in many ways a great and important
president, but surely this was not his finest hour. I am not against limiting
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judicial terms, although the Constitution does not provide for such for
federal judges. A retirement age of, say, 75 or so might be reasonable.
Anyone who's read some of my opinions knows I do not take a formalistic
approach to these questions, and it takes more than reciting the mantra of
"judicial independence" to get me worked up. But, as I said before, I am
against judicial reform driven by nakedly partisan, result-oriented
reasoning.
The experience of developing countries, former communist countries,
and our own political culture teaches us that we must be ever vigilant
against those who would strong-arm the judiciary into adopting their
preferred policies. It takes a lot of degeneration before a country gets to be
Zimbabwe. But if I might coin a phrase, we should avoid these ends by
avoiding these beginnings. I recently read a Washington Postop-ed called
"A Court Too Supreme For Our Good," where a Washington lawyer called
me and my colleagues "increasingly isolated, imperious and opaque," and
advocated, as what he called one "modest step toward a healthier
relationship with the public-and toward a healthier measure of
accountability," that Congress "cut the Supreme Court's budget until it
agrees to allow cameras and audio equipment into all federal courtrooms."
Given the political climate, and the tenuous grip many people have on the
concept of judicial independence, when I hear a threat to cut judicial
budgets, even when it is only about cameras, I get really worried.
This is where you come in. There is no natural constituency forjudicial
independence--except perhaps for a vibrant, responsible lawyer class, like
the people who will be educated in this building in the years to come. We
can't just trust the courts to protect themselves. For one thing, someone
has to people those courts, on both sides of the bench; and those someones
are you. For another, much of what makes a true threat to judicial
independence is the offending politician's motivation, which we in the
courts are often ill-equipped to ferret out. So the best defense against such
threats is the maintenance, and expansion, of our precious legacy: a culture
in which such threats are frowned on and are therefore unlikely to even get
off the ground. If I might coin another phrase, we cannot dedicate-we
cannot consecrate-we cannot hallow-this building. Rather, it is for the
students and professors who use these new classrooms, and the new library
space and offices in the old buildings that this construction has made
possible, to be dedicated to the practice and promise of our AngloAmerican common-law tradition, which makes the courts-armed with the
power ofjudicial review and protected by judicial independence-part of
the people's arsenal to enforce the rule of law and protect individual
freedoms.
Think about that as you use your splendid new building. I hope it
makes all the noise, demolition, construction, and flooding you have
suffered over the past year or so worthwhile.
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